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1. Description of the problem
For principal with many agents, the space of possible contracts is much
reacher than just the Cartesian product of individual (peace-rate) contracts
spaces. That is, the principal may find it profitable to induce the agents to
play a game by choosing their effort levels, not just to run several diversed
individual contracts. We will call such contracts by correlated incentive
schemes.
Exploiting correlated schemes, however, raise questions of implementabil-
ity. That is, the actual outcome of the second-stage game following a given
contract selected (and announced) by the principal may not coinside with
the one predicted. Hence, there is a quest for stable and unambigous solu-
tion concepts to be relied upon when the secon-stage game is being played.
One should take account of cooperation forces among the agents; Nash equi-
librium concept is rather too weak to rely upon, needless to say that there
may be several Nash equilibria.
Holmstrom (1982) was probably the first who studied team production
and correlated incentive schemes. Since and so far, the existing litera-
ture considered essentially only one type of correlated incentive contracts,
namely, rank-order contracts, or tournaments. These contracts are based
solely upon the comparison of individual outputs (the only thing that mat-
ters for a tournament is the agent’s rank, or his place in the list of outputs).
Mookherjee (1984) compared rank-order contracts with individual peace-
rate ones, and found that the former ones are welfare enhancing, comparing
to the latters. Malcomson (1986) provide additional motivation for analysing
the rank order contracts.
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However, there is a quest for studying more sophisticated incentive schemes,
not just tournaments or individual peace-rate contracts. There are two rea-
sons for that. The first is obvious: the space of all the incentive schemes for
the principal with many agents is much reacher than the joint of the two
types of contracts mentioned above. Hence, one may suggest that the set
of Pareto optimal contracts lies outside both classes just discussed (here,
Pareto optimality means that the effort level of no agent could be increased,
without decreasing the effort levels of some other agents).
The second reason was already mentioned above, and deals with the im-
plementation issue: rank-order contracts inplement too weak solution con-
cept in the second-stage game. Typically, it is just Nash equilibrium, and
which looks especially pessimistic, sometimes there are several of them (see
the literature cited above).
One could have assumed, following Mookherjee (1984), that the principal
could enforce a given equilibrium allocation (through the focal point effect),
but we proceed in another way. Namely, we will search for contracts that
implement a solution concept which is prone to coalition formations, and
essentially unique. Typically, such contracts will not dominate rank-order
ones, moreover, they often will be Pareto inferior to the latters, but their
inplementation will be unambigous. Then, we will discuss (second-best)
optimality of such contracts.
One would suggest that contracts which implement coalitionary stable
solutions may look too combersome to have any practical value. It turns
out, however, that these contracts were already introduced and studied, al-
though within a different framework. Namely, there is a vast literature on
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cooperative production and cost sharing mechanisms that pose questions of
implementation from a descriptive, positive viewpoint. That is, alternative
mechanisms are compared with respect to the quality of solution concept
they implement, regardless of any further consideration of efficiency prop-
erties of such mechanisms. The basic idea of this research is that the more
stable and unambiguous solution concept is being implemented by a given
mechanism, the better the mechanism is. Various concepts were proposed,
such as core allocations (Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), coalition-proof Nash
equilibria and Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria, dominance solvable equilib-
ria and, finally, strong equilibria. The latter, which is the most desirable, is
being implemented by the so-called serial cost sharing rule introduced by Lit-
tlechild, Owen (1973), and studied extensively in Moulin and Shenker (1992).
We adopt the apparatus of cost sharing theory to the principal-agent
relationships. In order to concentrate on implementation issues, we get rid of
the hidden information and moral hazard considerations, instead assuming
costly implementation of incentive schemes1.
Proceeding in this way, we first characterize the space of all contracts, or
incentive schemes, for the principal with n agents. Then, we introduce and
study a certain class of implementation schemes called multistep strategies
which resemble serial cost sharing rules used in Moulin and Shenker (1992).
Precisely, we adopt serial cost sharing of excludable public good from Moulin
(1994). Our schemes differ from Moulin’s in that there is no explicit cost
1Such an approach can be justified by the fact that, in many real situations, the problem
faced by the principal is rather not a problem of observability, but that of verification.
For instance, it is the case in the tax evasion practice, see Vasin, Panova (2000).
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function lying at the base of them. This cost function is prescribed by
the contract, and is essentially discontinuous. In spite of these differences,
schemes we analyse still admit the unique strong equilibrium; however, dis-
continuity (hence, nonconvexity) of the underlying cost function makes the
apparatus used in Moulin (1994) inapplicable directly to our situation.
In analysing equilibria, we use techniques of monotone comparative stat-
ics analysis as in Milgrom and Shannon (1994). It is based on the theory of
complete lattices (see Topkis (1998), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). One
of the by-products of the analysis is a theorem on existence and uniqueness
of a strong equilibrium for games of a certain class (which includes second-
stage games following any multistep strategy implementation). This class
is intimately related to the class of supermodular games (see Milgrom and
Roberts (1990)), although one cannot state the inclusion in either direction.
We conclude our analysis by characterizing the Pareto optimal incentive
schemes for principal with heterogeneous agents, and reducing the problem
faced by the principal to the finite-dimentional maximization.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic framework
for studying the many-agency problem, which is an n-inspection problem.
Section 3 introduces the class of multistep strategies, and discusses their
relation to serial cost sharing rules. Section 4 specifies a broad class of games
that will be demonstrated to have the unique strong equilibrium. Then,
we prove that multistep incentive schemes introduced in Section 3 induce
the second-stage game of this class. Section 5 begins with a discussion of
various solution concepts, and then states and proves the main theorem of
existence and (generally) uniqueness of a strong equilibrium for that class
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of games; moreover, it is demonstrated that this equilibrium is at the same
time the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium, and the unique coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium. Section 6 applies the general analysis to a normative
question of Pareto optimality properties of implementation schemes (from
the principal’s viewpoint). Section 7 concludes.
2. n-inspection problem
A basic framework of our analysis is what we call the n-inspection problem.
There is a principal who hires several (n) agents for some task. Agents could
cheat to some degree z ∈ [0, 1], and the fact of cheating (and its degree, as
well) will be revealed by the principal. However, one and only one agent
could ultimately be checked and punished, due to lack of time, or to the
complexity of the punishment procedure; penalty is assumed to be linear in
the cheating parameter. One could treat punishment as a subtraction of the
corresponding share of a salary. The question is whether it is possible to
reduce cheating by designing (and committing to) a wise punishment scheme
which attains a probability distribution of being checked to every possible
profile of cheating parameters.
It is by no means the only possible model specification allowing to analyse
incentive schemes with many agents. For instance, we could have designed
an incentive scheme in terms of wages, instead of costs (i.e. penalties), as
it is done in e.g. Malcomson (1984). But it is instructive to operate with
costs, for on this way we will easily refer to serial cost sharing rules used
in Moulin (1994), as well as other public finance literature. In our model,
it is assumed that wages are fixed and sufficient to satisfy the participation
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constraint even at the no-cheating point. The approach we have chosen is
applicable to a number of real-world situations, like tax evasion, corruption
deterrence etc.
Returning to our basic model, let us assume that the game is two-staged:
at the first stage, the principal announces and commits himself to a certain
incentive scheme, or contract specifying checking probabilities, conditional
upon the profile of cheating parameters realized (hence, observed). Es-
sentially this contract is a mapping from the set [0, 1]n of all the possible
cheating profiles to the set ∆n of all the probability distributions over the n
points (i.e. agents):
λ : [0, 1]n → ∆n. (1)
The set of all such mappings reflects the principal’s strategic opportunities.
At the second stage, agents simultaneously choose their parameters of
cheating zi ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the payoffs are realized, and the principal faces
the profile q = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ [0, 1]n (negatively) reflecting the efficiency of
the task fulfilled by the agents.
In order to complete the second-stage game description one should spec-
ify the agents’ preferences. We will assume the agents to be risk neutral, and
that their net benefits from cheating are characterized by benefits functions
bi(z) measured in the penalty units. We assume that these functions are
continuous, increasing, and satisfy the following property:
∀j > i, bj(z)− bi(z) is a nondecreasing function. (2)
This means that if one agent likes leasure more than another one, then the
more leasure is available, the greater this difference in pleasure will be. This
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holds if, for example, bi(z) are differentiable and ∀z b′j(z) > b′i(z), that is,
the marginal utility from leasure is also greater for the agent who appreciates
leasure more. One can notice that the agents are lineary ordered with respect
to the propensity to cheating, and this ordering coincides with the natural
ordering on the set n for which 1 < 2 < · · · < n.
Now, denoting by
λ(z1, . . . , zn) = (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ ∆n (3)
the resulting probability distribution, we can conclude that the payoff to
i-th agent equals
ui(q) = ui(z1, . . . , zn) = bi(zi)− zi · λi. (4)
Recall that λi depends on q, hence, on zi as well.
The principal possesses a certain objective functional X(q), and tries
to maximize it by selecting out the best incentive scheme λ. We postpone
the discussion of the maximization problem faced by the principal until Sec-
tion 6, where we will apply the general theory to make normative statements.
Our next step is to analyse the second-stage game. In the following section
we introduce the subspace of multistep strategies, or incentive schemes, in
the set of all the contracts available to the principal.
3. Multistep strategies
There are at least four reasons for subtracting the set of all possible incentive
schemes. First of all, one can notice that the strategy set of the principal is
enormously large. Indeed, it contains all the mappings from [0, 1]n to ∆n,
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essentially including discontinuous ones (Pareto optimal strategies, as a rule,
will be discontinuous). Maximization of the principal’s objective functional
over such a set seems to be intracktable. Secondly, a principal’s strategy
should not look too complicated, in order to be apprehended by the agents
(recall that it is announced to the agents before they choose the degrees of
cheating).
Third and forth rationales for subtracting the strategy set were discussed
in introduction: they deal with solution concepts to be explored, and ques-
tions of uniqueness of equilibrium. Uniqueness is required because if pro-
posed solution concept admits several equilibria, the principal will typically
have a headache of guessing which of them will actually be realized. And, of
course, it is usually better to have a solution concept as strong as possible,
not just a concept of Nash equilibrium, for coalitional forces will probably
destroy it2.
We now introduce a class of strategies which we call multistep strategies.
All of them induce the second-stage game to have the strong Nash equilib-
rium, and in general, this equilibrium will be unique. A typical multistep
strategy consists of several threshold levels
0 ≤ z¯1 < · · · < z¯k < 1, (5)
2If agents are diversed from each other, and cooperation looks impossible, one could
implement Nash equilibrium solution. In this case, there is no problem at all within our
framework of symmetric information since, as could be easily checked, the first-ranking
contract implements the unique Nash equilibrium of no-cheating (this contract consists
in deterministic checking of the agent with the maximum cheating parameter, with the
equal-probablility gamble between all of them if they are numerous).
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and probability distribution
(A1, . . . , Ak) ∈ ∆k (6)
over the set of these thresholds (this is not λ’s, as will be explained below: λ’s
lie in ∆n). The better way to specify the multistep strategy corresponding
to these data is to tell a fairy tale.
Assume that during the day, the agents are separated to n rooms, and
could not observe what others do until the end of the day (in order to exclude
dynamics from the story). If a given agent chooses z ∈ [0, 1], he simply
sleeps first z percent of time, wakes up by alarm and works all the rest
day. According to the multistep strategy, the principal runs a gamble with
corresponding probabilities {Al, l = 1, . . . , k}, and in case of l-th outcome,
he enters all the rooms right after the moment z¯l of time. Then, he randomly
penalizes one of the agents who is still sleeping, and precisely according to
his choice, z (known to the principal, say, from alarm clock at the agent’s
table).
This story has nothing to do with the real situation, but it helps to
become aquainted with the effect of a multistep strategy’s implementation.
Those who are familiar with Moulin and Shenker (1992) could find that
incentive schemes we propose resemble the serial cost sharing principle. This
becomes clear from their explanation of serial cost sharing in terms of a
“turning lights” story. Strategic properties of serial cost sharing also are
close to ours, though not completely coinside with the formers. Namely, our
multistep strategies generate multiple Nash equilibria, hence, the predicted
outcome of the second-stage game will not be dominance solvable3.
3I ought the idea that multistep strategies are essentially cost sharing rules to Shlomo
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The most closely connected to ours are serial cost sharing rules for public
goods provision in Moulin (1994). To explain why, let us interpret checking
probabilities assigned to agents as costs of cheating. Then, we have the
following symbolic picture: agents should bear together costs of producing
the maximal cheating parameter from the collection q = (z1, . . . , zn). Costs
are stepwise: it costs Al to produce any additional amount δz ∈ (0, z¯l+1− z¯l]
above z¯l (where we set z¯n+1 := 1). Costs are then divided exactly as in
Moulin (1994). The specification of the cost function is a strategic choice
of the principal. The only problem is nonconvexity and discontinuity of any
cost function constructed on this way.
Now, we could easily formalize multistep strategies, directly adopting
formulas from Moulin (1994). Probabilities λi depend on the parameters of
a multistep strategy in the following way:
λi =
∑
{l:z¯l<zi}
Al
#{j : z¯l < zj} . (7)
That is, agents with z > z¯l divide together costs Al for increasing the cheat-
ing degree above the threshold zl. Together with the formula (4), this com-
pletes the description of the second-stage game implemented by a typical
multistep strategy. Next section introduces a class of games which postu-
lates axiomatically the properties shared by payoff functions of any such
game.
Weber.
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4. Supermodular iterative monotone games
Consider a game Γ of n players. The set of all the players is denoted by
N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let a strategy set of all players be one and the same
compact subset Z ∈ R (for instance, a closed segment, like [0, 1]). Denote
by q ∈ Zn the profile of strategies chosen by the agents, q = (z1, . . . , zn),
and by q−i ∈ Zn−1 the profile of strategies chosen by agents other than i.
The set Zk inherits an ordering from the set Z (which looses its linearity for
k ≥ 2), and forms a complete lattice, with respect to this partial ordering.
Besides, we will need to preserve the linear ordering of the set N of the
players (or agents, synomically). It gives us a right to say that a profile
q = (z1, . . . , zn) is monotone if z1 ≤ · · · ≤ zn. The set < of monotone
profiles also forms a complete lattice (trivial exercise). Also, we denote by
q− a monotone profile of (n− 1) strategies.
The definition given below encorporates the main constructions and ideas
of monotone comparative statics theory (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994),
Topkis (1998), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990)), with those from Moulin
and Shenker (1992) inspired by the idea of defining serial cost sharing rules
axiomatically.
Definition. The game described below is called a Supermodular It-
erative Monotone game (or, simply, a SIM-game) iff the payoff functions
ui(z1, . . . , zn) = ui(zi; q−i) satisfy the following five properties.
1. Anonimuity. ∀i u(zi; q−i) depends only on the collection
q− = {zj |j 6= i} ∈ Zn−1, (8)
that is, does not change under permutations of the other agents. (In
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other words: it does not matter for Lesha whether Masha chooses z
and Ira chooses w, or vise-versa.)
This condition is adopted from Moulin and Shenker (1992) where it
was used for a characterization of serial cost sharing. We therefore
could write u(zi; q−) instead of u(zi; q−i), where q− denotes a monotone
transformation of q−i. Moreover, it will be useful to rewrite payoff
functions in the form of only one function u(z; [i, q−]). In what follows,
“>” means “ , but not =”.
2. Weak Single crossing property (WSCP) in (z; [i, q−]). Exactly
as in Milgrom and Shannon (1994): for z′ > z and (j, q′−)  (i, q−), if
u(z′; [i, q−]) ≥ u(z; [i, q−]) (9)
then
u(z′; [j, q′−]) ≥ u(z; [j, q′−]). (10)
This property (precisely, its strong form) is crucial for well-behaving
comparative statics, as shown in Milgrom, Shannon (1994); we will
need its relaxed analogue for monotonic properties of agents’ choices.
3. Monotonicity. ∀z ∈ Z and (j, q′−)  (i, q−) we have
u(z; [j, q′−]) ≥ u(z; [i, q−]). (11)
This resembles the “complementarity” of choices made by different
agents (compare with Milgrom and Roberts (1990)), and, at the same
time, the fact that agents with high indices occupate better positions
than those with low ones. This assumption will guarantee monotonic
properties of the agents’ payoffs.
13
4. Ordinal semi-dependence, or Iterativity. Together with the first
property, this one is being taken from Moulin and Shenker (1992): a
payoff ui of i-th agent does not depend on the choices not lower than
his own choice. Formally, let us denote by qz− the profile q− in which
all the components higher than z are replaced by z. Then, we require
that ∀i
ui(z, q−) = ui(z, qz−). (12)
In Moulin and Shenker (1992), this assumption was placed on cost
sharing rules; we switch it directly to the payoff functions.
Note that continuity is not required, and in fact, payoff functions arose
from the n-inspection problem will be discontinuous. We therefore
need a regularity condition which will guarantee that individual max-
imization problems nonempty and nicely-behaved solution sets. Such
a condition is well-known for this sort of models, and essentially states
that the function evaluated on the limit of a monotone sequence is not
lower than the limit of its valuations on the terms of this sequence.
5. Regularity condition. Payoff function u(z; [i, q−]), being considered
as a function of z ∈ Z, is an order upper semi-continuous (see precise
formulation in Milgrom and Roberts (1990)).
This regularity condition is fulfilled, for example, if payoff functions are
continuous except for a finite number of jumps down, and are left-side
continuous in the points of jumps (a mathematical triviality). It turns
out that all these properties are satisfied for the second-stage game of
the n-inspection problem with a multistep strategy implemented by
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the principal. This property completes the definition of a SIM-game.
Theorem 1 For any multistep strategy (5), (6), the second-stage game of
the n-inspection problem is a SIM-game with Z = [0, 1].
Proof is given in Appendix, together with the graphical illustration and
a discussion of an agent’s maximization problem.
5. Existence and uniqueness of a strong equilibrium
for SIM-games
Various solution concepts purifying Nash equilibrium
There are many solution concepts strengthening the notion of Nash equi-
librium. The commong problem most of them share is the generic non-
existence. As for Nash equilibrium, it typically exists, at least in convex
situations, because there are “the same number of” equations determining
them and variables to be determined. As for strengthening solutions, they
exist only under serious assumptions on the game form.
At the same time, if the family of games is under consideration, and
if this family is reach enough, there is a hope that some games within the
family have nonempty sets of solutions that are stronger than Nash equi-
librium. Our n-inspection story is an example: in the huge set of all the
possible incentive schemes for principal with many agents, there is a sub-
set of contracts that implement coalitionary proof solutions, namely, those
resulting in SIM-games at the second stage. Before analysing these SIM-
games, let us discuss various strengthenings (or purifications of the notion
of Nash equilibrium. We begin with the strongest solution concept.
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Strong equilibrium (SE). This notion was first introduced by Au-
mann (1959). A given allocation is said to form a strong equilibrium if there
are no coalitions of agents that could simultaneously change the strategies
of its members so as to increase the payoffs for all of them, given that other
agents hold on using strategies of the initial allocation. If no coalition could
increase the payoff of even one of its members holding others at the initial
level of utility, we call such an allocation superstrong equilibrium (SSE). This
is probably the most stable and unambiguous solution concept for one-shot
games. If the principal implements the scheme characterized by the only SE
in the second-stage game, he can safely predict the outcome of this game to
coincide with this SE.
Pareto optimal Nash Equilibrium (PONE). This simply claims
that, gethering altogether, agents could not do better for all of them then
in the Nash equilibrium allocation. If they could not increase the utility of
even one of them holding others at the initial level of utility, this is the strong
PONE, or simply SPONE. Every SE is at the same time PONE, and SSE
is SPONE. In PONE (and SPONE), the only working coalitions is the vast
majority plus individuals; in Nash equilibrium, the only working coalitions
are individuals. In the celebrated Prizonner’s Dilemma, there are no PONE,
neither SPONE (hence, neither SSE and SE): the only (dominance-solvable)
Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.
Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE). This notion is close to
the SE (or SSE), and differs in that it allows only those coalition formations
that are self-sustainable: coalition proposing better outcomes to their partic-
ipants should not generate stimula for second-round group deviations, again
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provided the latters are sustainable. The formal definition bears the induc-
tive nature, and could be found in pioneering work by Bernheim, Whinston
and Peleg (1987). Notice that, defining CPNE, we require that coalitions
offer strict increases in utility to all their participants. Every SE is a CPNE,
whereas there is no inclusion between CPNE and PONE sets, in general.
A disussion of various solution concepts of cooperative game theory also
could be found in Ichiishi (1993). One probably finds it difficult to cope
with all these notions and their interrelations. Fortunately, there is no need
in such an inquirry now: it turns out that every SIM-game have a (gener-
ally, unique) strong equilibrium (SE) which, in addition, could be obtained
iteratively by a very simple, straightforward procedure.
SIM-games: existence of a strong equilibrium
We begin our analysis of SIM-games by the following statement.
Lemma 1 In every SIM-game, the agent’s payoff function u(z; [i, q−]) has
a nonempty set f [i, q−] of argmaxima, for all pairs (i, q−) ∈ N×Zn−1. This
set f [i, q−] forms a complete sublattice in Z. As a consequence, there always
exists a maximum in this set, which we call z[i, q−]: ∀(i, q−) ∈ N × Zn−1
∀z ∈ Z u(z[i, q−]; [i, q−]) ≥ u(z; [i, q−]), and
∀z > z[i, q−] u(z[i, q−]; [i, q−]) > u(z; [i, q−]).
(13)
Proof could be found in Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
Next, we conduct the comparative statics with respect to [i, q−], that is,
analyse the responce functions z[i, q−] introduced above.
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Lemma 2 The function z[i, q−] is nondecreasing with respect to both argu-
ments (or equivalently, being considered as a function over the partially or-
dered set N×Zn−1), and so is the induced payoff function u(z[i, q−]; [i, q−]).
Proof is a trivial consequence of the monotonicity and WSCP properties.
For instance, to prove monotonicity of z[i, q−], one needs to replace z′ =
z[i, q−] in WSCP, which gives us that for [j, q′−] ≥ [i, q−], z[i, q−] is at least
as good as z < z[i, q−], hence, z[j, q′−] ≥ z[i, q−] (recall the definition of a
function z[i, q−] as the maximum of argmaxima set f [i, q−]). The same for
utility, using standard envelope argument.
Various modifications of this obvious assertion could be found in Top-
kis (1978), who is probably the first to state this property explicitely. One
corollary of this result is very important.
Corollary. The mapping f¯ : Zn → Zn, defined by
f¯(q) := (z[1, q−1], . . . , z[n, q−n]), (14)
is a monotone transformation of a complete lattice Zn.
Now we apply the celebrated Birkgoff —Knaster —Tarski theorem to
the mapping f¯ : Zn → Zn.
Theorem 2 For any complete lattice H and its monotone transformation
h, the set of fixed points is nonempty, and forms a complete sublattice in H.
The SUP of the sublattice of equilibria is a transfinite limit of a sequence
SUP (H)→ h(SUP (H))→ h2(SUP (H))→ . . . .
Proof could be found in Tarski (1955), or in Topkis (1998).
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This gives us the existence theorem for Nash equilibria, since obviously
every fixed point of the mapping f¯ is a Nash equilibrium. The reverse is not
true, because f¯ is not a best-responce correspondence but just a maximal best
responce function. We introduce the whole best responce correspondence by
f(q) := f [1, q1]× · · · × f [n, qn] ⊂ Zn (15)
where f [i, q−] is the argmaximum set of u(z; [i, q−]), with respect to z. Nash
equilibria are precisely fixpoints of this correspondence. Denote by q∗ the
SUP of the lattice of all the fixpoints of the mapping f¯ . The following lemma
asserts that q∗ is the SUP of the set of all Nash equilibria.
Lemma 3 For every Nash equilibrium q˜ ∈ Zn we have q∗  q˜.
Proof. If q˜ is an equilibrium, it means that q˜ ∈ f(q), with f¯(q) obviously
being the SUP of the set f(q). Hence, we have that f¯(q˜)  q˜. Apply-
ing transfinite times f¯ to the obvious inequality I  q˜ and taking transfi-
nite limits (see Topkis (1998)), we obtain the required property (recall that
translim(f¯ t(I)) coinsides with q∗).
Turning to the next item, we state the basic proposition, which proof is
complicated and postponed until the Appendix.
Lemma 4 The maximal equilibrium q∗ = (z∗1 , . . . , z∗n) could be obtained
through the following iterative inductive procedure (in the first string, [1;. . . ]
means that this is the best responce of the agent 1 to the profile q− =
(S, . . . , S) ∈ ZN−1, where S = SUP (Z); other strings being treated by the
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analogy. We have I = (S, . . . , S)):
z∗1 = z[1;S, . . . , S];
z∗2 = z[2; z∗1 , S, . . . , S];
. . . . . .
z∗k = z[k; z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
k−1, S, . . . , S];
. . . . . .
z∗N = z[N ; z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
N−1].
(16)
Notice that it is not the iterative process I → f¯(I) → f¯(f¯(I)) . . . . For
the calculational purposes, the process in (16) is much more convenient. It
turns out that its theoretical value is great as well: it is a powerful technical
tool. Armed with this tool, let us turn to the next item.
Lemma 5 The maximal equilibrium q∗ is at least as good for all the agents
as any allocation q = (z1, . . . , zN ) such that q  q∗, hence, as any other
equilibrium allocation.
Proof. Indeed, we have the following chain of inequalities ∀i:
ui(zi; q−i) ≤ ui(zi; q∗−i) ≤ ui(z∗i ; q∗i ), (17)
of which the former one is stated in lemma 2, while the latter expresses the
equilibrium nature of q∗.
Next theorem is the basic result of the paper.
Theorem 3 The maximal equilibrium q∗ is a superstrong equilibrium of any
SIM-game.
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Proof. To prove that q∗ is an SSE, assume that there is a coalition
J ⊂ N of deviators, and values {z′i| i ∈ J} of strategies for its members such
that, ∀i ∈ J ,
ui(z′i; q
′
−i) ≥ ui(q∗), (18)
with at least one strict inequality (by q′ we denote the allocation ({z′i| i ∈
J}; {z∗i | i /∈ J})). Take the first agent i ∈ J who increases his choice:
z′i > z
∗
i , and z
′
j ≤ z∗j ∀j < i (provided such agents ever exist). For this
agent one has the following contradiction:
ui(z′i; q
′
−i) ≤ ui(z′i; z∗1 , . . . , z∗i−1, S, . . . , S) <
< ui(z∗i ; z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
i−1, S, . . . , S) = ui(q
∗).
(19)
Let us comment on this. First inequality follows from the fact that the
profile from Zn−1 in the second term is by-componently not lower than the
profile q′−i, by the definition of i; second stems from the fact that z
∗
i is
a maximal best responce to (z∗1 , . . . , z∗i−1, S, . . . , S), by the construction of
lemma 4. The last is the ordinal semi-dependence property.
It means that there are no agents whose strategy z′i > z
∗
i . But in this
case, we have q′  q∗, and so, q∗ is at least as good as q′ for all the agents,
hence, ∀i ∈ J as well. So, there are no possibilities to collude and block the
allocation q∗. The proof of theorem 2 is complete.
Corollary. The sets of SE, PONE, SPONE and CPNE are all non-
empty and contain a maximal element (which is q∗).
Indeed, any SSE belongs to every set mentioned above, so all of them
contain q∗. At the other hand, all these sets itself are subsets of the set NE
of all the Nash equilibria, of which q∗ is a supremum.
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Questions of uniqueness
Let us now turn to the question of uniqueness of equilibrium. To start with,
we state the following proposition which is a direct sequence of monotonicity
and WSCP properties.
Lemma 6 In the SSE q∗, the first agent attains absolute (i.e. first-best)
maximum of utility. Inductively, every agent i attains his second-best max-
imum of utility, constrained by the fact that first (i− 1) agents attain their
second-best in a similar fascion (with the first one attaining his first-best).
This lemma leaves us without a hope that q∗ could be a unique PONE:
every allocation (z∗1 , . . . , z∗i , z
∗
i , . . . , z
∗
i ) is a PONE (generally) because the
attempt to increase individually the degree z over common z∗i -value results
in a very high probability of checking, hence, it is unprofitable; so, such an
allocation typically is a Nash equilibrium. And this equilibrium is Pareto
optimal since the first i agents attain their constrained maximal utility levels,
as in the allocation q∗.
However, such an allocation generally is not a SPONE: switching to-
gether to q∗ does not decrease utilities of all the agents, and, provided some
regularity conditions hold, increase the utilities of the agents i + 1, . . . , n.
These conditions are summarized in the following theorem of uniqueness.
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Theorem 4 Assume that all the sets
f [1;S, . . . , S];
f [2; z∗1 , S, . . . , S];
. . . . . .
f [k; z∗1 , . . . , z∗k−1, S, . . . , S];
. . . . . .
f [N ; z∗1 , . . . , z∗N−1]
(20)
are single-valued (the so-called First Regularity Condition, or FRC); and
that the function u(z; [i, q−]) is strictly increasing in those components of q−
that are lower than z (this is Second Regularity Condition, or SRC). Then,
all the sets SSE, SE, SPONE and CPNE are single-valued.
Proof is straitforward: Given an allocation q˜ which is a candidate for
SSE, SE, SPONE or CPNE, we find the first agent i whose z˜i < z∗i (recall
that q˜  q∗, since at least q˜ pretends to be a Nash equilibrium). Then, we
form a coalition of (i+ 1, . . . , n) and offer them their equilibrium strategies
z∗j . In this case, it is easy to check that FRC and SRC imply the strict
increase in the utility level of all the coalition members. For CPNE, we
need to establish additionally that the new allocation is sustainable. But the
strategies for deviators are SSE-allocation strategies, hence, form a CPNE.
Proof is over.
6. Optimal multistep strategies
Let us now turn back to the N -inspection problem, and analyse strategic
opportunities of the principal. First of all, let us discuss the uniqueness
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properties for this application. It turns that FRC is typically satisfied for
the n-inspection problem.
Lemma 7 Except for a subset of measure 0, all the multistep strategies
induce a second-stage game satisfying FRC.
Proof is purely mathematical: we notice that every condition on the set
f [i; q−] to be single-valued is a (nongenerate) equation on the data (5), (6).
A standard calculus concludes the proof.
As for SRC, generally it does not hold for the n-inspection problem.
The obstacle is a stepwise character of the utility functions. Nevertheless, it
could be replaced by the requirement that every set f [i, q−] contains no more
than one point within every interval (z¯l, z¯l+1]. It turns out that, under quite
natural conditions, this is satisfied with probability one. Below is presented
a result whose proof is analogously purely mathematical and is skipped.
Theorem 5 If every benefit function bi(z) is iether convex or concave on
[0, 1], then, except for null-set, all the correspondences SE, SSE, SPONE,
and CPNE are single-valued (being defined over the set of all multistep
strategies).
Now we are going to analyse the optimal multistep strategies. No matter
which objective functional X(q) is being used, a question arises concerning
the Pareto-efficiency of a given strategy: whether it is the least costly (and
the easiest) way to implement a given profile, q. The next (and the last)
theorem answers to this question.
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Theorem 6 For every SSE profile q∗ of a multistep strategy (5), (6) the
following N -stepped strategy (z∗1 , . . . , z∗N ; A¯1, . . . , A¯N ) implements a profile
q˜∗  q∗ (possibly, coinciding with the latter):
A¯i =
∑
z¯l∈[z∗i ,z∗i+1)
Al, (21)
Proof consists of applying the iterative procedure of lemma 4 step by
step, and involving inductive argument. See Savvateev (2003).
Corollary. In characterizing Pareto optimal multistep strategies for
principal with N agents, it is sufficient to consider the (2N −1)-dimensional
manifold (to be more precise, a manifold with corners) of N -stepped strate-
gies.
This corollary allows to reformulate the problem of choosing the optimal
strategy of the principal as the finite-dimentional maximization, whatever
functional X(q) is being used. Even without further research, one can design
at least a computer program. Namely, we take a sufficiently frequent net
on the (2N − 1)-dimentional cube, and for every vertex of this net the
iterative process is conducted which results in the strong Nash equilibrium
corresponding to that vertex (i.e. to the following strategy of the principal).
According to Theorem 3, this process requires maximum N iterations. Once
equilibrium is approached, the objective functional is applied to it, and then
the best strategy is being selected.
Special cases N = 1 and N = 2 are solved in Savvateev (2003) explicitely.
Also, one can find there a complete characterization of implementable al-
locations q∗, and a system of equations characterizing the multistep strat-
egy implementing a given allocation q∗, if it is implementable. However,
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to perform such an analysis, we need an additional assumption that ben-
efits functions are linear in the cheating parameter: bi(z) = bi · z, where
b1 ≤ · · · ≤ bN . It is assumed, further on, that the principal observes the
bundle (b1, . . . , bN ), but not individual characteristics bi for every agent.
Interesting aspects arise on this way concerning the so-called chain-
reaction effect which is responsible for the implementability of a given allo-
cation. This effect has various policy implications (see Savvateev (2003)).
7. Conclusion
In the paper, a principal-agent model with many agents is analysed which
is free of informational assymetries. The primary focus was made on the
nature of a strategic space of the principal, especially on its useful subspace
of the so-called multistep incentive schemes. These schemes generally induce
the unique strong equilibrium allocation in the game that is played by the
agents when they choose their effort levels.
Also, the conditions guaranteeing the existence and the uniqueness of
the strong equilibrium, as well as of some alternative solution concepts, are
generalized and presented in a purely game-theoretic form. The kind of
games under study are in a close connection with a supermodular games
studied in the literature on comparative statics. Additional assumptions
made came from the serial cost sharing method used in a public finance
literature. It is the combination of these two approaches that results in the
existence and uniqueness of a strong equilibrium.
After the general game-theoretic analysis, the principal-agent framework
with many agents is reconsidered, and Pareto optimal incentive schemes are
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characterized. It turns out that, despite the huge and intractable nature of
the space of all the incentive schemes, the set of Pareto optimal multistep
contracts is a finite-dimentional and easily observable submanifold.
Also, iterative procedure is described for obtaining the strong equilibrium
for any multistep strategy. This procedure both helps a lot in theoretical
investigation of the games under study, and provides a way to solve for the
optimal incentive scheme numerically, given a specific form of an objective
functional of the principal. Possible applications of the theory are given.
Appendix
Proof of theorem 1. For convenience, we reproduce here formulas specifying the
sort of games under study. Payoffs are given by
ui(q) = ui(z1, . . . , zN ) = bi(zi)− zi · λi(z1, . . . , zN ), (22)
where λi is being determined by the parameters of a multistep strategy through
the following formula
λi =
∑
{l:z¯l<zi}
Al
#{j : z¯l < zj} . (23)
We need to prove that the game specified by (22) and (23) satisfy 5 properties
of section 4. Let us start with the regularity condition. Namely, we will show that
payoff functions are continuus elsewhere except for points zl, l = 1, 2, . . . , k where
it experiences a jump down, and is left-side continuous at these points. As was
mentioned in Section 4, this is sufficient for order upper semi-continuity.
The proof is a graphical one. The figure 1a below illustrates the components of
the payoff function of i-th agent as a function of his choice variable, z (for the case of
a two-stepped incentive scheme [(z1, z2); (A1, A2)]). The continuous line starting
at zero-point represents his benefits function, bi(z). The cost function, which is
z · λ(z; q−), is peacewise linear but discontinuous, and has jumps up exactly at
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threshold levels z1 and z2. The resulting payoff function is demonstrated at the
figure 1b, and it is apparent that it satisfies the required property.
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z · λ(z; q−)
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1
6
 
 
 
  
z¯1 z¯2 1 -
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u(z; [i, q−])
z¯1 z¯2 1
Figure 1a. Components Figure 1b. A typical
of a payoff function payoff function
Let us now turn to the first four properties. As for the anonimuity, it follows
from formulas (22), (23) immediately, since the only thing that matters is the
numbers of agents choosing cheating degrees within the corresponding intervals.
The same with the ordinal semi-dependence (or iterativity). Every term in (23)
with z¯l < zi will not be altered if those who choose z ≥ zi will switch to z = zi
instead, whereas other terms equal zero.
Let us prove the monotonicity of the payoff functions. If one changes agent i to
j > i holding q− unaltered, the balance equals bj(z)− bi(z) and is nonnegative, by
the definition. If, alternvely, we switch from q− to q′−  q−, this makes every term
in (23) nonincreasing, for the numerator holds the same while the denominator
could only increase (given z¯l, the number of the agents whose choices exceed z¯l
increases or remains the same). Therefore, λi nonincreases, which implies that
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ui(z; q−) nondecreases.
As for the WSCP, consider z′ > z. If we have u(z′; [i, q−]) ≥ u(z; [i, q−]), it
means that
bi(z′)− bi(z) + zλi(z; q−)− z′λi(z′; q−) ≥ 0. (24)
Actually λi does depend only on its argument, and not on i, thus decomposing the
proof into two distinct parts: increasing i to j > i, and increased q− to q′−  q−.
Increasing i is a simple case: by the assumption, the function bj(z) − bi(z) is
nondecreasing in z, so we have
bj(z′)− bi(z′) ≥ bj(z)− bi(z) ⇔ bj(z′)− bj(z) ≥ bi(z′)− bi(z). (25)
Increasing q− requires a little more work. Our goal again is to establish that
(omitting index i, due to already proved anonimuity)
zλ(z; q′−)− z′λ(z′; q′−) ≥ zλ(z; q−)− z′λ(z′; q−). (26)
Rearranging, one can see that this is equivalent to
z′(λ(z′; q−)− λ(z′; q′−)) ≥ z(λ(z; q−)− λ(z; q′−). (27)
As z′ > z, it is sufficient to demonstrate that expressions in brackets are compared
to the needed direction. Both present a sum of several members of a type
Al
#{j : z¯l < zj} −
Al
#{j : z¯l < z′j}
, (28)
and notice that all these terms are nonnegative, due to the argument used to prove
monotonicity. Moreover, these terms are identical in both sides of (27)! The only
difference consists in their numericity: the LHS of (27) contains not less of them,
since z′ > z. So, increasing q− also results in increase of the term in (24) it responds
for. Summing up, we conclude that (24) nondecreases when switching from [i, q−]
to [j, q′−] ≥ [i, q−]. Hence, it is still nonnegative. WSCP property is established.
The proof of theorem 1 is complete.
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Proof of lemma 4. We first prove that the allocation (z∗1 , . . . , z
∗
n) defined by
the iterative procedure (16) is a monotone profile. We proceed inductively: assume
that the sub-profile (z∗1 , . . . , z
∗
i ) is monotone, and consider z
∗
i+1. We have
z∗i+1 = z[i+ 1; z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
i , S, . . . , S] ≥
z[i; z∗1 , . . . , z
∗
i , S, . . . , S] = z[i; z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
i−1, S, . . . , S] = z
∗
i ,
(29)
where the last equality follows easily from ordinal semi-dependence axiom, in a way
similar to that used in proving theorem 3.
Now, we establish that the allocation (z∗1 , . . . , z
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium. Again,
we use the same argument: inductively, and using monotonicity, we have that
z∗i = z[i; z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
i , S, . . . , S] = z[i; z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
i−1, z
∗
i , . . . , z
∗
i ] =
z[i; z∗1 , . . . , z
∗
i−1, z
∗
i+1, . . . , z
∗
n].
(30)
And lastly, we will prove (again, inductively) that the allocation q∗  q˜ for
every Nash equilibrium allocation q˜. Namely, if it is proved that z∗j ≥ z˜j for
j = 1, . . . , i− 1, then
z∗i = z[i; z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
i−1, S, . . . , S] ≥
z[i; z˜1, . . . , z˜i−1, z˜i+1, . . . , z˜n] ≥ z˜i,
(31)
because z[i; q−i] = max{f [i; q˜−i]}, and z˜i ∈ f [i; q˜−i].
Summing up, we have proved that q∗, obtained by the inductive procedure (16),
is the maximal Nash equilibrium. Proof of lemma 4 is complete.
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